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JUDGES AS POLITICIANS: 
THE ENDURING TENSION OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS IN 
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
Richard Lorren Jolly* 
Elections transform the basis of judicial legitimacy.  Whereas a 
permanently appointed judiciary finds support in its supposed neutrality, 
the democratic judiciary demands responsiveness.  Yet while this is obvious 
to scholars, the electorate, and most judges—and is in fact confirmed by 
much statistical data—the Supreme Court and others continue to insist that 
judicial campaigns can be sculpted to ensure robust democratic debate 
without compromising the bench’s impartiality.  This Essay rejects the 
notion that the court can be both democratic and disinterested.  It reviews 
the volatile history of judicial elections as well as the modern web of 
distinctions between protected and proscribable campaign speech.  It 
concludes that elections are incompatible with judicial impartiality, that 
the elected judiciary of the twenty-first century is a third political branch 
charged with delivering democratic goods, and that it delivers regularly. 
INTRODUCTION 
It’s an election year.  Politicians all over America are meeting 
constituents, making promises, and raising money—and so are judges.  
This last point might surprise those hailing from abroad.  “To the rest of 
world,” as one judge quipped, “the American adherence to judicial 
elections is as incomprehensible as our rejection of the metric system.”1  
Indeed, only two other nations use elections for selecting or retaining 
 
 ©  2016 Richard Lorren Jolly.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce 
and distribute copies of this Essay in any format, at or below cost, for educational purposes, 
so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the 
Notre Dame Law Review Online, and includes this provision in the copyright notice. 
 *  Research Fellow for the Civil Jury Project, New York University School of Law.  
Thanks go to Justice Bridget McCormack, the students of the Michigan Law Supreme Court 
Elections seminar, and Maja Martin.  Of course, all errors are my own.   
 1  Hans A. Linde, Elective Judges: Some Comparative Comments, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1995, 1996 (1988).   
72 N O T R E  D A M E  L A W  R E V I E W  O N L I N E  [VOL. 92 
judges,2 compared to thirty-nine American states.  This means that ninety 
percent of all state judges in the United States face democratic scrutiny at 
some point.3 
This is not a new development: judicial elections date back to the 
early nineteenth century.  But while past judicial elections were rather tame 
affairs, the twenty-first century has seen these contests grow increasingly 
politicized.4  For instance, in the 2012 Michigan Supreme Court campaign, 
Republican opponents of Democrat-backed candidate Bridget McCormack 
critiqued her pro bono experience by airing attack ads claiming that 
McCormack had “volunteered to help free a terrorist.”5  Elections have 
grown increasingly expensive, too.  In 2000, 2002, and 2004, all judicial 
candidates combined raised $123 million in campaign funds, which was 
nearly double the amount spent in the three previous cycles.6  And from 
2003 to 2004, state supreme court candidates alone raised a combined 
$46.8 million.7  Consequently, judicial elections—which were once 
colorfully described as being just as exciting as “playing a game of 
checkers by mail”—have become fully politicized sports not unlike those 
seen for traditional public office.8 
These intense judicial contests largely resulted from court decisions 
holding restrictions on judicial candidates’ campaign speech 
unconstitutional.  The watershed case is Republican Party of Minnesota v. 
White, in which the Supreme Court ruled that Minnesota’s Announce 
Clause—which forbade candidates for judicial office from declaring their 
views on disputed legal and political issues—violated the First 
 
 2  Switzerland elects some lay judges of canton courts, and Japan’s Supreme Court 
judges face infrequent retention elections.  See Jed Handelsman Shugerman, The Twist of 
Long Terms: Judicial Elections, Role Fidelity, and American Tort Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 1349, 
1351 n.3 (2010) (citing Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries 
and the Rule of Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 691 n.3 (1995)).   
 3  Matthew J. Streb, The Study of Judicial Elections, in RUNNING FOR JUDGE: THE 
RISING POLITICAL, FINANCIAL, AND LEGAL STAKES OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 1, 7 (Matthew J. 
Streb ed., 2007) [hereinafter RUNNING FOR JUDGE].   
 4  Janet Stidman Eveleth, Restoring Civility to Judicial Elections, 41 MD. B.J. 48, 48 
(2008).   
 5  See Andrew Rosenthal, Opinion, Everyone Deserves Legal Representation, N.Y. 
TIMES: TAKING NOTE (Nov. 1, 2012, 3:35 PM), 
http://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/11/01/everyone-deserves-legal representation/?. 
 6  See Streb, supra note 3, at 1 (citing DEBORAH GOLDBERG ET AL., THE NEW POLITICS 
OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2004: HOW SPECIAL INTEREST PRESSURE ON OUR COURTS HAS 
REACHED A ‘TIPPING POINT’—AND HOW TO KEEP OUR COURTS FAIR AND IMPARTIAL 13 
(2005), 
http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/d/download_file_10569.pdf).   
 7  Id.   
 8  Id. at 2.   
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Amendment.9  Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia acknowledged the 
tension in Minnesota’s attempt to secure an open-minded yet elected 
judiciary,10 but reasoned that “the First Amendment does not permit it to 
achieve its goal by leaving the principle of elections in place while 
preventing candidates from discussing what the elections are about.”11  
Over the next decade and a half, courts addressing campaign restrictions 
have struggled to reconcile the tension between ensuring a robust 
democratic election and recognizing the compelling state interest in 
securing an actual and perceived unbiased judiciary. 
This Essay rejects the notion that the bench can be at once both 
democratic and impartial.  The tension between these two concepts is 
irreconcilable because informed elections make judges responsible for 
delivering democratic goods and transform the judiciary into a political 
branch.  The argument proceeds in three parts.  First, Part I reviews the 
history of judicial elections, emphasizing their uneasy beginnings and 
cataloguing the various electoral systems practiced today.  Next, Part II 
assesses the twenty-first-century court’s struggle to balance the tension 
between democracy and judicial legitimacy, analyzing the illogical web 
delineating protected and unprotected judicial-campaign speech.  Finally, 
Part III evaluates the current state of judicial elections, drawing upon 
scholarship, judicial experiences, and recent statistical data to show that the 
tension persists and cannot be resolved. 
I.     A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 
States did not always elect their judges.  To the contrary, all thirteen 
original states appointed judges in some fashion.  Eight vested appointment 
in one or both of the houses, two utilized gubernatorial appointments with 
legislative confirmation, and three utilized gubernatorial appointment with 
the consent of an executive council.12  In most ways, this system mirrored 
the federal approach of executive appointment with the advice and consent 
of the Senate, which itself migrated from the English tradition of king-
selected judges.13  During the eighteenth century, then, the American 
judiciary was insulated from direct democratic scrutiny. 
This consensus on judicial appointments slackened with the rise of 
Jacksonian democracy.  Around the early and mid-nineteenth century, 
 
 9  536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002). 
 10  Id. at 779. 
 11  Id. at 788.  
 12  Rachel Paine Caufield, The Curious Logic of Judicial Elections, 64 ARK. L. REV. 
249, 252 (2011) (citing LARRY C. BERKSON ET AL., JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE UNITED 
STATES: A SPECIAL REPORT (2010), 
http://judicialselection.us/uploads/documents/Berkson_1196091951709.pdf).   
 13  See id.   
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citizens began emphasizing political accountability and direct participation 
in government decisionmaking.14  The unelected and unaccountable 
judiciary proved an obvious target.  Compared to their appointed 
counterparts, voters considered elected judges more independent from 
political elites and therefore worthy of greater public trust and 
confidence.15  Georgia was the first state to employ elections, passing a 
constitutional amendment to elect lower court judges in 1812.16  
Mississippi moved to elect the entirety of their judiciary in 1832.17  And 
most noteworthy, every state entering the Union after 1845 opted for 
judicial elections over appointments.18 
The enthusiasm for democratic judiciaries was short-lived, however.  
Mid-century industrialization brought with it political machines that came 
to dominate all facets of the political process—including judicial 
elections.19  The electorate began to view the elected bench as corrupt, 
unethical, and unqualified.20  For example, in considering a proposal to 
elect judges in Massachusetts, one delegate argued that other states’ 
judiciaries had already “fallen hopelessly into the great cistern” and had 
made judges part of the “political mill.”21  And after only two decades of 
holding judicial elections, the New York legislature openly considered a 
return to appointments.22  By 1906, Roscoe Pound, then Dean of Harvard 
Law School, warned: 
 
 14  See Rachel Paine Caufield, How the Pickers Pick: Finding a Set of Best Practices 
for Judicial Nominating Commissions, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 163, 167 (2007) (first citing 
ALLAN ASHMAN ET AL., THE KEY TO JUDICIAL MERIT SELECTION: THE NOMINATING PROCESS 
9–10 (1974); then citing CHARLES H. SHELDON & LINDA S. MAULE, CHOOSING JUSTICE: THE 
RECRUITMENT OF STATE AND FEDERAL JUDGES 4 (1997); and then citing Larry C. Berkson, 
Judicial Selection in the United States: A Special Report, in JUDICIAL POLITICS: READINGS 
FROM JUDICATURE 50, 50 (Elliot E. Slotnick ed., 2005)).   
 15  See Kermit L. Hall, Progressive Reform and the Decline of Democratic 
Accountability: The Popular Election of State Supreme Court Judges, 1850–1920, 1984 AM. 
B. FOUND. RES. J. 345.   
 16  EVAN HAYNES, THE SELECTION AND TENURE OF JUDGES 108 (Lawbook Exchange, 
Ltd. 2005) (1944).   
 17  Luke Bierman, Beyond Merit Selection, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 851, 854 (2002) 
(citing MARY L. VOLCANSEK & JACQUELINE L. LAFON, JUDICIAL SELECTION: THE CROSS-
REVOLUTION OF FRENCH AND AMERICAN PRACTICES 90 (1988)).   
 18  Id. (citing VOLCANSEK & LAFON, supra note 17, at 90).   
 19  Caufield, supra note 14, at 168.   
 20  Id.   
 21  Larry C. Berkson, Judicial Selection in the United States: A Special Report, 64 
JUDICATURE 176, 176–77 (1980) (quoting Russell D. Niles, The Popular Election of Judges 
in Historical Perspective, THE RECORD OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF 
NEW YORK 528 (1966)).   
 22  Id. at 177.   
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[W]e must not be deceived by . . . inevitable discontent with all law into 
overlooking or underrating the real and serious dissatisfaction with 
courts and lack of respect for the law which exists in the United States 
to-day . . . . 
       . . . . 
       . . . Putting courts into politics and compelling judges to become 
politicians in many jurisdictions has almost destroyed the traditional 
respect for the bench.23 
Despite Pound’s warnings, states continued throughout the twentieth 
century to compel potential judges to campaign for their seat. 
A middle way emerged during the twentieth century in the form of 
merit selection, also known as the “Missouri Plan.”  Like many 
progressive-era reforms, merit selection began as an academic attempt to 
remove power from the electorate and vest it with experts instead.24  The 
approach combined non-partisan nominating commissions with periodic 
retention elections, under the belief that appointive systems were better 
able to identify strong judges while elections guaranteed their 
accountability.25  The American Bar Association endorsed merit selection 
in 1937, and soon after Missouri became the first state to adopt the 
system—hence the namesake Missouri Plan.26 
Today, the Missouri Plan—with its commissions of experts—is the 
most common approach to selecting judges.  It is utilized in twenty-four 
states as well as the District of Columbia.27  A small number of other states 
employ similar appointment schemes.  In California, Maine, and New 
Jersey, judges are chosen through gubernatorial appointment with the 
advice and consent of the legislature.28  And in Virginia and South 
Carolina, legislatures rather than governors appoint judges.29  All of these 
 
 23  Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of 
Justice, Address Before the Annual Convention of the American Bar Association (Aug. 29, 
1906), in 14 AM. LAW. 445, 445, 450 (1996).   
 24  Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The Politics of Merit Selection, 74 MO. L. REV. 675, 677 
(2009). 
 25  Caufield, supra note 14, at 169–70.   
 26  Id. at 170.   
 27  These states include: Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District 
of Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, 
Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South 
Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, and Wyoming.  See id. at 171, 180 (citing AM. 
JUDICATURE SOC’Y, JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE STATES: APPELLATE AND GENERAL 
JURISDICTION COURTS (2004), 
http://www.judicialselection.us/uploads/documents/Judicial_Selection_Charts_1196376173
077.pdf).   
 28  See Judicial Selection in the States, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, 
http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/ (last visited Dec. 23, 2016).   
 29  Id.   
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appointment-based systems employ periodic retention elections.  While 
retention elections in most states are uncontested—meaning that only the 
incumbent judge is listed on the ballot—a judge’s performance is no less 
susceptible to electoral scrutiny in these jurisdictions. 
Other states use elections both to choose and retain judges.  Interstate 
distinctions are plentiful, with perhaps the most important being whether or 
not the election is partisan.30  A partisan election is one in which the 
judicial candidate is designated on the ballot as belonging to a particular 
political party, not unlike a candidate for the legislature or executive.  A 
non-partisan election is one in which the judicial candidate is presented on 
the ballot without party identification, not unlike a candidate for a 
municipal position.  Partisan elections are only slightly less common than 
non-partisan elections; eight states employ the former while thirteen 
employ the latter.31  And some states, for example Michigan, formally 
utilize a non-partisan system, though the two major political parties vet, 
nominate, and even indirectly fund candidates.32 
II.     JUDICIAL ELECTIONS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
As shown above, states have generally enjoyed broad authority to 
structure their judicial elections.  The twenty-first century, however, has 
seen the Supreme Court and others severely constrain that freedom.  
Informed by developing conceptions of political speech, the Court started 
its perilous endeavor of trying to ensure robust judicial elections while 
simultaneously recognizing the states’ interest in encouraging an unbiased 
and impartial judiciary.  Over the last decade and a half, the Court’s project 
has resulted in a web of distinctions between protected campaign speech 
and that which states may proscribe.  Though these distinctions may be 
reasoned, the results are absurd. 
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White sparked this development.33  
In that case, five Justices of the Supreme Court invalidated part of 
Minnesota’s Code of Judicial Conduct prohibiting judicial candidates from 
“announc[ing] his or her views on disputed legal or political issues.”34  
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, found that the Announce Clause did 
not pass constitutional muster because the speech restriction was not 
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.35  In reaching this 
 
 30  For an in-depth discussion on the difference between partisan and non-partisan 
elections, see generally Chris W. Bonneau & Damon M. Cann, Party Identification and 
Vote Choice in Partisan and Nonpartisan Elections, 37 POL. BEHAV. 44 (2015).   
 31  See Judicial Selection in the States, supra note 28.   
 32  Id.   
 33  536 U.S. 765 (2002).   
 34  Id. at 768 (quoting MINN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(i) (2000)).   
 35  Id. at 776. 
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conclusion, the Court rejected the argument that a candidate announcing 
her views posed a special threat to her actual or perceived open-
mindedness.36  Avoiding preconceptions on legal issues is impossible, the 
Court reasoned, and pretending that a judge lacks such preconceptions 
would be foolish and undesirable.  And regardless, a meaningful distinction 
exists between a judge announcing her views and her promising a particular 
ruling.37  According to the Court, the judge who has merely announced a 
view—rather than promised a specific outcome—will not feel wed to a 
particular ruling once elected. 
The majority also worried that the restriction prevented the electorate 
from forming and casting knowledgeable votes.  Though the Minnesota 
Supreme Court had construed the Announce Clause to allow general 
discussions of caselaw and judicial philosophy—allowing, for instance, a 
candidate to assert that she is a “strict constructionist”—Justice Scalia 
criticized this as insufficient to ensure an informed electorate.38  The Court 
specified that judicial philosophies carry “little meaningful content for the 
electorate unless [they are] exemplified by application to a particular issue 
of construction likely to come before a court.”39  So while states can decide 
whether or not to hold judicial elections, “[that] greater power . . . does not 
include the lesser power to conduct elections under conditions of state-
imposed voter ignorance.”40  Candidates must be allowed to inform the 
voters on the issues. 
The majority’s opinion provoked impassioned dissents.  Justice 
Stevens stressed the uniqueness of the judiciary, noting that “[e]lected 
judges, no less than appointed judges, occupy an office of trust that is 
fundamentally different from that occupied by policymaking officials.”41  
He acknowledged the foolishness of pretending that judges lack 
preconceptions, but explained: “The lawyer who writes an article 
advocating harsher penalties for polluters surely does not commit to that 
position to the same degree as the candidate who says ‘vote for me because 
I believe all polluters deserve harsher penalties.’”42  Indeed, to an electorate 
forming views on the court’s impartiality, the difference between an 
announcement and a promise is a distinction without a difference.  As 
Justice Ginsburg contended in her dissent, when candidates publicize their 
positions the public reasonably expects a “quid pro quo—a judicial 
 
 36  See id. at 778–80. 
 37  Id. at 780–81.   
 38  Id. at 773 (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 29, White, 536 U.S. 765).   
 39  Id.   
 40  Id. at 788 (quoting Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 349 (1991) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting)).   
 41  Id. at 797 (Stevens, J., dissenting).   
 42  Id. at 801.   
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candidate’s promises on issues in return for the electorate’s votes at the 
polls.”43  Query: What other way could they possibly view it? 
Though White only addressed Minnesota’s Announce Clause, its 
consequences rippled.  Spurred by the new pronouncement, judicial 
hopefuls successfully mounted challenges to campaign restrictions across 
the country.  Challengers appealed rules prohibiting judicial candidates 
from overt political acts including: making promises or commitments, 
personal solicitation of funds, endorsing other politicians, announcing 
political party affiliations, and making false or misleading statements.44  
And some states, in a deliberate effort to avoid litigation, amended their 
rules to make them less restrictive and thereby make the elections more 
political.  For instance, North Carolina welcomed the newly politicized 
judiciary by altering its rule from, “A judge should refrain from political 
activity inappropriate to his judicial office,” to the polar opposite, “A judge 
may engage in political activity consistent with his status as a public 
official.”45  White did not predetermine these changes, but the difficulty of 
balancing the central tension of judicial elections was clearly evident. 
One particular area exemplifying this difficulty is courts’ treatment of 
partisan-affiliation clauses—that is, rules prohibiting a judicial candidate 
from announcing whether she is, say, a Republican or a Democrat.  The 
Supreme Court has not addressed the issue, but the Sixth, Seventh, and 
Eighth Circuits have all overturned party-affiliation restrictions.46  The 
Sixth Circuit’s decisions are worth scrutinizing.  In Carey v. Wolnitzek, 
Judge Sutton likened Kentucky’s party-affiliation clause with the 
Announce Clause at issue in White.  Party affiliations, he explained, are a 
type of “shorthand” that allow candidates to “announc[e]” their views on 
many issues at once.47  Preventing such shorthand announcements violates 
the candidate’s right to speak and the electorates’ right to be meaningfully 
informed. 
Six years later, the Sixth Circuit reviewed an almost identical rule in 
Winter v. Wolnitzek, on appeal from the Kentucky Supreme Court.48  
Because Kentucky’s judicial elections are non-partisan, the new rule 
prohibited candidates from “suggesting to the voters that the candidate is 
 
 43  Id. at 818 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).   
 44  See J.J. GASS, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., AFTER WHITE: DEFENDING AND AMENDING 
CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS 2–3 (2004), 
http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/d/ji4.pdf.  
 45  Id. at 4 (emphasis added).   
 46  See Carey v. Wolnitzek, 614 F.3d 189 (6th Cir. 2010); Siefert v. Alexander, 608 
F.3d 974 (7th Cir. 2010); Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 416 F.3d 738 (8th Cir. 2005) 
(en banc).   
 47  Carey, 614 F.3d at 202.   
 48  Winter v. Wolnitzek, 834 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2016).   
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the endorsed judicial nominee of a political party.”49  A candidate could not 
claim, for instance, “I am the conservative Republican,” because it 
insinuated that the candidate was supported by the Republican Party.  
Judge Sutton, writing again, held that the regulation was impermissibly 
vague because it provided a candidate little guidance for when she could 
exercise her right to affiliate with a political party, versus when she implied 
an impermissible connection.50  The article “the” proved a constitutionally 
insufficient differentiator.51 
Though both Carey and Winter are well-reasoned, the results are 
absurd.  While it is true that party-affiliation can be used as a shorthand 
announcement for a variety of positions, it also communicates a great deal 
more to the electorate.  Party-announcements paint candidates in partisan 
colors, transforming them into the judicial counterpart of the Red and Blue 
legislative and executive candidates.  Moreover, the advantage of 
informing the electorate of this association is doubtful.  From a 
jurisprudential viewpoint, it is unclear what it means to be a “Republican 
judge” or a “Democrat judge.”  Political machines do not enlighten judicial 
voters; they merely politicize the contest.  Kentucky surely understood this 
when it chose to employ non-partisan elections.  And while Kentucky 
remains free to hold non-partisan elections post Carey and Winter, it may 
not prevent a candidate from informing the electorate of her party-
affiliation or bending her words to suggest that she is party-endorsed.  
Now, Kentucky may only withhold party-affiliation from the ballot—
information that voters likely already came to know through the 
candidate’s campaign. 
Despite these dramatic developments, the Supreme Court has only 
addressed judicial elections twice since White.  In 2009, the Court dealt 
with campaign contributions and judicial recusal in Caperton v. A.T. 
Massey Coal Co.52  There, a justice on the West Virginia Supreme Court 
refused to recuse himself in a case involving a coal company that donated 
three million dollars to his campaign.53  The justice cast the deciding vote 
in favor of the donor, and the loser appealed arguing that it was denied due 
process.  The Supreme Court agreed, explaining that recusal is required 
when “the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or 
decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.”54  The Court 
explained that while “[n]ot every campaign contribution by a litigant or 
attorney creates a probability of bias that requires a judge’s recusal,” 
because of the amount of money donated here—which constituted more 
 
 49  Winter v. Wolnitzek, 482 S.W.3d 768, 776 (Ky. 2016).   
 50  Winter, 834 F.3d at 689.   
 51  Id. 
 52  556 U.S. 868 (2009).   
 53  Id. at 873–74. 
 54  Id. at 872 (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975)).   
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than all other donors combined—the “probability of bias” was simply “too 
high.”55  Of course, as Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent acknowledged, this 
rationale invites more questions than answers.56  Most importantly: How 
big of a contribution does it take to compromise judicial integrity?  The 
majority didn’t even attempt an answer. 
The last word from the Supreme Court came in 2015.  In Williams-
Yulee v. Florida Bar, the Court upheld a Florida restriction on judicial 
candidates personally soliciting campaign funds.57  The Court took pains to 
emphasize the uniqueness of the judiciary, stating not once but twice: 
“Judges are not politicians.”58  Because of the judiciary’s traditional role as 
an impartial moderator, Florida could lawfully restrict candidates from 
personally soliciting campaign funds in order to preserve “public 
confidence in the integrity of the judiciary.”59  But are appearances all that 
matter?  The Florida rule still allowed candidates to indirectly raise funds 
through campaign committees and even permitted candidates to personally 
write thank-you notes to donors.  Perhaps the Court is correct that there is a 
perceptible difference between candidates asking for money and directing 
donors to a committee, but the bench’s actual impartiality remains fully 
compromised.  Judges may not be able to request funds, but they know who 
is footing the bill. 
As shown, the Court’s balancing project has delivered peculiar results: 
judges may announce their beliefs, so long as they do not promise a 
specific vote; judges may declare their party-affiliations and imply 
endorsements, even in non-partisan elections; judges may consider 
democratic input, but not if a specific voter gave too much money; and 
judges may direct potential donors to their campaign committees, but not 
personally solicit funds.  These bizarre results—say the courts—tame the 
tension between meaningful elections and an actual and perceived impartial 
judiciary. 
III.     THE IRRECONCILABLE TENSION 
Courts’ attempts to balance judicial campaigns between ensuring 
informed elections and an impartial judiciary are admirable, but futile.  
Once judges are free to announce their views, affirm political affiliations, 
and indirectly raise money, the bench ceases to be impartial.  Because the 
elected judiciary’s legitimacy can no longer be found in providing unbiased 
rulings, courts must instead stake their legitimacy in securing democratic 
 
 55  Id. at 884.   
 56  Id. at 893–98 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (posing forty questions left unanswered by 
the majority’s opinion).   
 57  135 S. Ct. 1656, 1662 (2015).   
 58  Id. at 1662, 1672.   
 59  Id. at 1666.   
2016] J U D G E S  A S  P O L I T I C I A N S  81 
goods.  Thus, despite the Supreme Court’s refrain, elected judges are 
politicians.  To be sure, all of the data suggests that judges are understood 
by voters and among themselves as politicians, and that they act 
accordingly. 
There are many ways to achieve judicial legitimacy.  Federal judges, 
for instance, are largely considered legitimate because of their electoral 
unaccountability.  These judges are appointed by the executive, confirmed 
with the advice and consent of the Senate,60 and hold their office “during 
good Behaviour”61—which is almost without exception life tenure.  Since 
there can be no formal retribution resulting from the ordinary course of 
their decisionmaking, federal judges do not face democratic scrutiny.  This 
is beneficial because, as Alexander Hamilton explained, an appointed and 
unaccountable bench protects against the “encroachments and oppressions 
of the representative body,” and is “the best expedient which can be 
devised in any government, to secure a steady, upright, and impartial 
administration of the laws.”62  Put simply, unelected judges can make 
unpopular rulings in order to protect individuals or minorities without fear 
of retribution.  It is their role in ensuring adherence to the Constitution that 
makes them legitimate. 
But an appointed judiciary is not without shortcoming.  There is a 
conceptual difficulty with a democracy consisting of a coequal government 
branch that is neither elected nor accountable.63  Constitutional scholar 
Erwin Chemerinsky described this “counter-majoritarian difficulty”64 as “a 
paradigm that emphasizes the democratic roots of the American polity and 
that characterizes judicial review as at odds with American democracy.”65  
An unaccountable body wielding the power to review democratically 
enacted laws—even striking them down as it alone sees fit—is 
incompatible with representative government and is therefore unjustifiable, 
critics claim.66  This is no new argument: Thomas Jefferson recognized that 
making judges “dependent on none but themselves” ran counter to the 
principle of “a government founded on the public will.”67  Put another way, 
unaccountable judges may choose to act as untouchable super-legislators, 
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impeding democratic developments and leaving the public with few 
options. 
Judicial elections solve the counter-majoritarian difficulty, yet in so 
doing pose their own inverse problem—a “majoritarian difficulty.”68  
Professor Steven Croley describes this: instead of worrying “how 
unelected/unaccountable judges can be justified in a regime committed to 
democracy,” the majoritarian difficulty asks “how elected/accountable 
judges can be justified in a regime committed to constitutionalism.”69  The 
concern is that when judges must answer to the public, they are less likely 
to impartially apply the law and more likely to respond to political 
pressures.70  Critically, elected judges may be less likely to rule in favor of 
unpopular parties, especially if they have reason to believe that doing so 
will affect their chances at reelection.  Reciprocally, they will be more 
likely to rule for favorable voters and campaign contributors.  With judicial 
elections, rule of law takes a backseat to political expediency. 
There is no easy solution to the majoritarian difficulty.  Elections 
strike at the heart of the judiciary’s purpose, at least as conventionally 
understood.  Historically, judges are unique among state actors because 
their legitimacy is founded not in providing democratic outcomes, but 
rather in providing undemocratic impartiality.71  Many have noted that the 
judiciary—more so than any other government branch—is able to develop 
public good will, legitimize government policies, and generate voluntary 
conformance with laws.72  The public’s delicate willingness to extend this 
deference is based at least in part on the perception that judges are removed 
from the ordinary sway of politics—their application of the law governed 
not by partisan ideology, but rather by logic or even some sense of 
wisdom.73  In fact, studies repeatedly show the most significant factor in 
the public’s evaluation of the judiciary is the perceived fairness of court 
processes.74  That is to say, Americans traditionally care less about 
outcomes than they do about fairness.75 
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But elected judges are incapable of maintaining perceptions of judicial 
fairness.  Elections not only expose those men and women behind the 
bench, they explicitly require the public to choose which individuals will 
apply and evolve the law.  This democratic exercise betrays the concept of 
the law as impersonal, independent, and objective.  In the layman’s mind, 
how can there be a judicial election if the law exists in serene neutrality?  
Of course, critics will fault this characterization.  They will argue that the 
perception of law being applied by nondescript, objective, and wise men 
and women is pure fantasy—and they would be absolutely correct.  The 
law is not self-executing and there are many flaws with the “judge-as-
umpire” analogy made famous by Chief Justice John Roberts.76  Calling 
“balls and strikes” necessarily involves subjectivity, and judges—whether 
appointed or elected—bring their preconceptions to the bench. 
To succumb to this critique, however, is to misunderstand both the 
judiciary and the analogy’s depth.  The umpire’s decisions are legitimate 
not because he is objective in marking the strike zone, but because he 
benefits from the systemic integrity of the game.  The coaches may spit, 
bump chests, and kick dirt as much as they please; none of it changes the 
umpire’s position as the disinterested arbiter.  Yet imagine that it came to 
be known that one of the teams had selected this particular umpire from 
among many, surrounded him with influential and moneyed individuals, 
and showered him with power and prestige.  They further told him that if 
he did not rule in their team’s favor that he would fast find himself out of 
the park.  In this hypothetical, all of the umpire’s calls would be rightly 
compromised, regardless of how “objectively” he called the game.  Each of 
his calls would be scrutinized for real or imagined bias.  This is precisely 
the predicament of the elected judiciary: from the public’s seat, elected 
judges mean a rigged game. 
Yet even a rigged game can be played.  And this is precisely what has 
happened with the advent of hyper-politicized judicial elections following 
White.  New free-for-all contests have entangled jurists in voters’ minds 
with the executive and legislative branches, as well as with the political 
parties.  Judges have come to be seen not as neutral and independent 
arbiters, but as Red and Blue politicians for the third political branch.  This 
result is unsurprising.  If a judge is to be held democratically accountable, 
she cannot assert legitimacy as an independent arbiter.  She is necessarily 
seen as in the pocket of those who put her on the bench.  The only 
alternative, then, is to abandon conceptions of judicial impartiality and, 
instead, provide democratic goods.  That is to say, elected judges must call 
“balls and strikes” as the people who put them there would want.  The 
majoritarian difficulty so commands. 
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This need not be an apocalyptic prospect.  If, as the data suggests, 
Americans are more interested in having a neutral and independent 
judiciary than one that is ruled by partisan ideology,77 then that public is apt 
to support and fund those judicial candidates whom they believe will rule 
most fair-mindedly.  Justice Kennedy makes precisely this point in his 
Williams-Yulee dissent.  “If the State is concerned about unethical 
campaign practices,” he suggests, “it need not revert to the assumption that 
voters themselves are insensitive to ethics.”78  Ensuring free and open 
elections “might stimulate discourse over the requisite and highest ethical 
standards for the judiciary, including whether the people should elect a 
judge who personally solicits campaign funds.”79  Citizens are free to elect 
judges who will adhere to traditional notions of judicial neutrality, or 
instead choose those who actively deliver political goods.  Democracy is 
the solution to, not the problem with, judicial elections. 
Still, the general public, and even the judges themselves, see things 
differently.  According to a 2007 poll conducted by the Annenberg Public 
Policy Center, “69% [of the public] thinks that raising money for elections 
affects a judge’s rulings to a moderate or great extent.”80  These sixty-nine 
percent appear to be onto something.  According to another poll, over sixty 
percent of judges indicated that fear of losing an election affects their 
judicial behavior.81  Judges express that they experience this fear even 
when losing an election is highly unlikely, for instance in unopposed 
retention elections.82  Former California Supreme Court Justice Otto Kaus 
explained this phenomenon: “There’s no way a judge is going to be able to 
ignore the political consequences of certain decisions, especially if he or 
she has to make them near election time.  That would be like ignoring a 
crocodile in your bathtub.”83 
Statistics bear out this crocodile.  For instance, the Brennan Center for 
Justice at New York University School of Law found that judges hand out 
significantly longer sentences in serious, violent criminal cases the closer 
the sentencing judge is to running for re-election.84  And the more 
 
 77  See, e.g., MURPHY, supra note 72; Croley, supra note 68; Gibson, supra note 72. 
 78  135 S. Ct. 1656, 1684 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).   
 79  Id.   
 80  KATHLEEN HALL JAMIESON, ANNENBERG PUB. POLICY CTR., PUBLIC 
UNDERSTANDING OF AND SUPPORT FOR THE COURTS (2007), 
http://www.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/Downloads/20071017_JudicialSurvey/Judicial
_Findings_10-17-2007.pdf.   
 81  Larry T. Aspin & William K. Hall, Retention Elections and Judicial Behavior, 77 
JUDICATURE 306, 312 (1994).   
 82  Id. at 313.   
 83  Paul Reidinger, The Politics of Judging, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1987, at 52, 58. 
 84  KATE BERRY, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, HOW JUDICIAL ELECTIONS IMPACT 
CRIMINAL CASES 7 (2015) (citing Gregory A. Huber & Sanford C. Gordon, Accountability 
2016] J U D G E S  A S  P O L I T I C I A N S  85 
frequently television ads air during an election, the less likely elected state 
supreme court justices are to rule in favor of criminal defendants.85  
Imposition of capital punishment is particularly affected by judicial 
elections: over the past fifteen years, appointed judges reversed death 
sentences twenty-six percent of the time, while judges facing retention 
elections reversed fifteen percent of the time and judges facing competitive 
elections reversed only eleven percent of the time.86  Elected judges, either 
implicitly or explicitly, regularly rule against those who are politically 
disfavored. 
Judges also consistently rule in favor of their campaign donors.  In a 
large empirical study, Stephen Ware identified a “remarkably close 
correlation between a justice’s votes on arbitration cases and his or her 
source of campaign funds.”87  And a New York Times study found that Ohio 
Supreme Court justices voted in favor of their contributors more than 
seventy percent of the time, with one justice voting for his contributors an 
astounding ninety-one percent of the time.88  That same study found that 
potentially compromised justices often refuse to recuse themselves: “In the 
215 cases with the most direct potential conflicts of interest, justices 
recused themselves just 9 times.”89  These judicial actors are not ensuring 
the neutrality of the court; they are ensuring their continued place on the 
democratic bench.  The tension of judicial elections requires these judges to 
stake their legitimacy in ruling according to their voter’s wishes.  To some 
extent, they are simply doing their jobs. 
Judicial elections thereby transform the relationship between the 
judiciary and the public, creating a new political market for the delivery of 
democratic goods.  No longer is the court removed and neutral, but instead 
it is a third political branch.  As Melinda Gann Hall found in her recent 
empirical assessment of judicial campaigns, “Partisan state supreme court 
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elections in many respects resemble their legislative and executive 
counterparts.”90  So now, that citizen who is concerned with, say, the death 
penalty,91 may look not only to her elected legislators to pass harsher laws, 
her elected executive to seek convictions, but now also her elected judges 
to impose or uphold the sentence.  The Supreme Court’s belief that the 
tension of judicial elections can be tamed is fool-hearted: democracy 
demands responsiveness, and politician-judges will deliver. 
CONCLUSION 
It remains to be seen whether a judiciary legitimized by its democratic 
appeal rather than its role as a neutral arbiter can persevere.  Although 
judicial elections have existed for nearly two hundred years, it has only 
been fifteen years since the Supreme Court and others have fully opened 
these contests to the political machines.  This practice places the judiciary 
and the whole constitutional system in a perilous position.  Writing on the 
subject more than two centuries ago, Alexander Hamilton explained: 
“There is no liberty, if the power of judging be not separated from the 
legislative and executive powers.  Liberty can have nothing to fear from the 
judiciary alone, but would have every thing to fear from its union with 
either of the other departments.”92  Today, a majority of states have merged 
the three branches and welcomed in the political parties.  And the resulting 
tension cannot be easily tamed by creative carve-outs to campaign speech.  
Constitutionalism may whither to twenty-first century judicial populism. 
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